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EQUIVALENT MATRICES UP TO PERMUTATIONS
S¸TEFAN O. TOHAˇNEANU AND JESUS VARGAS
ABSTRACT. Given two k×nmatricesA and B, we describe a couple of methods to solve the matrix equation
XA = BY , where X is an invertible k × k matrix, and Y is an n× n permutation matrix, both of which we
want to determine. We are interested in pursuing those techniques that have algebraic geometric flavour. An
application to solving such a matrix equation comes from the cryptanalysis of McEliece cryptosystem. By using
codewords of minimum weight of a linear code, in concordance with these methods of solving XA = BY ,
we present an efficient way to determine the entire encryption keys for the McEliece cryptosystems built on
Reed-Solomon codes.
1. INTRODUCTION
A permutation on the set [n] := {1, . . . , n}, is a bijective function σ : [n] → [n]. The set of all
permutations on the set [n] forms a group, denoted here with Sn, with multiplication being defined by the
composition of functions. The identity element will be denoted here with e. For more information we
suggest [3, Chapter 5].
The most classical notation for a permutation σ ∈ Sn is σ =
(
1 2 · · · n
σ(1) σ(2) · · · σ(n)
)
. A cycle
( i1i2 · · · im−1im ) is the permutation σ defined as σ(j) = j for all j ∈ [n] \ {i1, . . . , im}, and σ(i1) =
i2, . . . , σ(im−1) = im, σ(im) = i1. Every permutation is a product of disjoint cycles, and every two disjoint
cycles commute. The inverse of the cycle σ = ( i1i2 · · · im−1im ), is the cycle σ
−1 = ( imim−1 · · · i2i1 ).
An n×nmatrix P is called a permutation matrix if there is σ ∈ Sn such that P is obtained by permuting
according to σ the columns of the identity matrix In; if σ(i) = j, then the i−th column of In is moved to
become the j− column of P . To specify the permutation σ, we denote here P = In(σ). We have
(In(σ))
−1 = In(σ
−1) = (In(σ))
T .
Let K be any field. Let A and B be two given k × n matrices with entries in K. We say that A and B are
equivalent up to a permutation if an only if there exist an invertible k × k matrix S with entries in K, and
an n× n permutation matrix P such that
A = SBP.
Equivalently, the matrix equation
XA = BY
has a solution (i.e., X = S−1 and Y = P ).
There are several instances where pairs of equivalent matrices up to a permutation occur:
• Permutation matrices show up often in various matrix decompositions, especially in LU decompo-
sition. For example, [7, Theorem 1] says that any k × n matrix A of rank r can be decomposed as
A = QBP , where B is a product of a k × r lower-triangular matrix and an r × n upper-triangular
matrix, and both Q and P are permutation matrices of appropriate sizes.
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• Suppose G is the generating matrix (of size k× n) of a linear code of dimension k. Using Gaussian
elimination, we can bring G to the “standard form”, which is a matrix of the form [Ik|A], where Ik
is the identity k× k matrix, and A is a k× (n− k) matrix. While the Gaussian elimination process
is captured in a k × k invertible matrix SG, there exists an n× n permutation matrix PG, such that
SGGPG = [Ik|A];
just permute the pivot columns accordingly. The (n − k) × n matrix H := [−AT |In−k] is called
the parity-check matrix of the linear code. If we are to be picky, this is true only if PG is the identity
matrix In. In general case, the true parity-check matrix of the code isHP
T
G .
• The public key of the McEliece cryptosystem is a matrix A that it is known to be equal to SBP ,
where S is invertible, P is a permutation matrix, and B is a convenient matrix of the same size as
A, all these three matrices being a part of the encryption key. Though it would defeat the security
purpose of this cryptosystem, if B is also known, it is an interesting exercise to find the remaining
two matrices S and P . As an application to our methods of solving the matrix equation XA = BY ,
we will assume that B is the generating matrix of a Reed-Solomon code, and that this matrix is also
known to us.
• If A is equivalent to B up to a permutation, i.e., A = SBP , then AT = P TBTST , and so
AAT = (SB)(SB)T .
This factorization resembles a lot to the Cholesky decomposition of the symmetric matrix AAT .
The structure of the paper is the following. First in Section 2.1 we briefly discuss about two more or
less standard methods to detect and determine permutations in vectors, and we focus on a third method that
it is more complete than the previous two, and it has an algebraic flavour to it. Next, in Section 2.2 we
extend this preferred method to detecting and determining permutations in matrices. Along the way, for our
personal preference, we end up computing some affine varieties. In Section 3 we focus our attention on
some cryptanalysis of the McEliece cryptosystems built on Reed-Solomon codes. It turns out that finding
the corresponding affine varieties we mentioned above, is computationally very expensive. Therefore we
develop an attack that uses projective codewords of minimum weight of Maximum Distance Separable
(MDS) codes (see Section 3.2.1).
Since lots of concepts are coming into play from various areas, we tried to be as self-contained as possible,
but without overloading the notes with too much information.
Acknowledgement We thank Dr. Alex Suchar (from University of Idaho) for the discussions on the subject,
especially on the sorting method to detect permutations in vectors (Section 2.1.2).
2. SOLVING MATRIX EQUATIONS XA = BY
2.1. Detecting permutations in vectors. The group Sn acts on the vector space K
n in the following way.
If σ ∈ Sn and v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ K
n, then
σ ∗ v := (vσ(1), vσ(2), . . . , vσ(n)) = v · In(σ
−1) ∈ Kn.
In order to have a well-defined action we must have
σ ∗ (τ ∗ v) = (τσ) ∗ v.
Given two vectors v,w ∈ Kn, our goals in this subsection is to find methods to decide if there exists
σ ∈ Sn such that w = σ ∗ v, and determine the permutation σ.
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2.1.1. Method 1: brute-force scanning. The first natural method to answer our goals requires to scan each
entry inw and compare it to all entries in v. For this technique we have at most
n(n− 1)
2
comparisons, and
also we have to create a vector where we record the permutation σ:
(1) we take the first entry of w, namely w1, and compare it to all entries of v until we find the first
match w1 = vi1 ;
(2) then we take the second entry of w, namely w2, and compare it to all entries of v except for the
i1−th entry, until we find the first match w2 = vi2 ;
(3) and so forth.
If we get matchings all the way through, then σ is the permutation σ(1) = i1, σ(2) = i2, . . ..
Example 2.1. Suppose K = F7, the prime field with 7 elements, and suppose
v = (6, 1, 3, 1, 0, 0) and w = (0, 3, 6, 1, 1, 0).
• Scan w1 = 0, and observe that the first match is with v5. Record σ(1) = 5.
• Scan w2 = 3 (if needed skip 5th entry in v), and observe that the first match is with v3. Record
σ(2) = 3.
• Scan w3 = 6 (if needed skip 3rd and 5th entries in v), and observe that the first match is with v1.
Record σ(3) = 1.
• Scan w4 = 1 (if needed skip 1st, 3rd and 5th entries in v), and observe that the first match is with
v2. Record σ(4) = 2.
• Scan w5 = 1 (if needed skip 2nd, 1st, 3rd and 5th entries in v), and observe that the first match is
with v4. Record σ(5) = 4.
• Scan w6 = 0, and observe that it matches with the remaining entry from v, not considered yet, v6.
Record σ(6) = 6.
So we obtained the permutation σ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
5 3 1 2 4 6
)
. Indeed σ ∗ v = w.
There are 2! · 2! such permutations, because v (and also w) has two entries that each repeats twice.
Above we determined just one of them. Is there a nice scanning algorithm that will determine all of these
permutations?
2.1.2. Method 2: total-ordering of the field. On any set we can choose a total-ordering of its elements
(meaning that any two elements can be compared, and declare which one is “bigger” than the other).
For a finite field K with primitive element α, this choosing can be done in a more standard way: we make
0 to be the “smallest” element, and any x ∈ K \ {0} has a unique representation x = αix , for some unique
ix ∈ {0, . . . , |K| − 2}. Then for any x, y ∈ K \ {0}, we say that x is “smaller” than y if and only if ix ≤ iy.
More particularly, if K = Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, then instead of using the standard order above, we
could use the more natural total-ordering 0 < 1 < 2 < · · · < p− 1.
Once we have such a total-ordering, for any vector v ∈ Kn there exists a permutation σv ∈ Sn such that
the entries of σv ∗ v are in increasing order. Of course, w = σ ∗ v if and only if σv ∗ v = σw ∗w. In this
instance, we have
w = σ−1
w
∗ (σv ∗ v) = (σvσ
−1
w
) ∗ v,
so the permutation σ is just σvσ
−1
w
.
Example 2.2. Using the same vectors from Example 2.1, we have
(15326)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σv
∗v = (0, 0, 1, 1, 3, 6),
and
(26345)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σw
∗w = (0, 0, 1, 1, 3, 6).
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Note that we wrote the permutations with their disjoint cycles decomposition.
Then σ = (15326)(54362) = (15423), which, is exactly the same permutation we obtained in Example
2.1. It is not quite by chance that this happened; the way we obtained the permutations σv and σw was by
“first match” scanning we are doing in Section 2.1.1.
2.1.3. Method 3: an algebraic approach. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ K
n. Define the polynomial
Qv(T ) = (T − v1)(T − v2) · · · (T − vn) ∈ K[T ],
and denote with qi(v), i = 0, . . . , n the coefficient of T
i. By Vieta’s formulas, with qn(v) = 1, for
k = 1, . . . , n, one has
qn−k(v) = (−1)
k
∑
1≤i1<···<ik≤n
vi1vi2 · · · vik .
Of course, if wt(v) = m, then qn−m−1(v) = · · · = q0(v) = 0 and qn−m(v) 6= 0.
We have the following immediate lemma:
Lemma 2.3. Given two vectors v,w ∈ Kn, then we have the following immediate equivalent statements:
(1) There exists σ ∈ Sn such that σ ∗ v = w.
(2) Qv(T ) = Qw(T ).
(3) For all i = 0, . . . , n, one has qi(v) = qi(w).
(4) For all j = 1, . . . , n, one has Qv(wj) = 0.
This criterion seems to be more convenient to decide if a desired permutation σ exists, but it does not
determines it. Below we present a method that finds all the permutations σ, if they exist.
Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ K
n. For each i = 1, . . . , n, consider the polynomial
pi,v(T ) =
Qv(T )
T − vi
∈ K[T ].
LetDv(T ) be the greatest common divisor of the polynomials p1,v(T ), . . . , pn,v(T ), and consider the poly-
nomial vector:
Rv(T ) :=
(
p1,v(T )
Dv(T )
, . . . ,
pn,v(T )
Dv(T )
)
∈ K[T ]n.
Suppose w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ K
n is obtained by permuting the entries of v. Suppose
wj1 = · · · = wjs = vi1 = · · · = vis .
Then, for all u = 1, . . . , s,
Rv(wju) = (0, . . . , 0, au︸︷︷︸
i1
, 0, . . . , 0, au︸︷︷︸
is
, 0, . . . , 0),
where au 6= 0. Next, consider the vector
Rju,v =
1
au
Rv(wju).
By placing in order the vectors R1,v,R2,v, . . . ,Rn,v as the rows of a matrix, we obtain an n× n matrix
with entries only 0’s and 1’s. In the instance of repeated entries as above, the rows j1, . . . , js will be the
same having 1’s in positions i1, . . . , is, and 0’s everywhere else. This is saying that we can choose σ such
that σ(ju) = iv, for any u, v ∈ {1, . . . , s}. So from this n× n matrix we can extract an n× n “submatrix”
that has exactly one 1 in each row and each column, hence it is a permutation matrix; namely it is In(σ).
If the vector v has exactly t distinct entries, each repeating si times, then, as it should happen, we have
s1! · s2! · · · · · st! options to select this submatrix.
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Example 2.4. We apply the above method for the vectors v and w from Example 2.1. We have
p1,v(T ) = (T − 1)
2(T − 3)T 2
p2,v(T ) = (T − 6)(T − 3)(T − 1)T
2
p3,v(T ) = (T − 6)(T − 1)
2T 2
p4,v(T ) = (T − 6)(T − 3)(T − 1)T
2
p5,v(T ) = (T − 6)(T − 3)(T − 1)
2T
p6,v(T ) = (T − 6)(T − 3)(T − 1)
2T.
ThenDv(T ) = (T − 1)T , and hence
Rv(T ) = ((T − 1)(T − 3)T, (T − 6)(T − 3)T, (T − 6)(T − 1)T, (T − 6)(T − 3)T, (T − 6)(T − 3)(T − 1), (T − 6)(T − 3)(T − 1)).
Rv(w1) = Rv(0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 3)
Rv(w2) = Rv(3) = (0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0)
Rv(w3) = Rv(6) = (6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
Rv(w4) = Rv(1) = (0, 3, 0, 3, 0, 0)
Rv(w5) = Rv(1) = (0, 3, 0, 3, 0, 0)
Rv(w6) = Rv(0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 3).
The 6× 6 matrix with entries only 0’s and 1’s is


0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1


, from which we can select the
submatrix
I6(σ) =


0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


,
meaning that the permutation is σ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
5 3 1 2 4 6
)
= (15423).
The other three submatrices are the following (with the corresponding permutations):

0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


with permutation (1523),


0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0


with permutation (165423),
6 S¸TEFAN O. TOHAˇNEANU AND JESUS VARGAS
and 

0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0


with permutation (16523).
2.2. Detecting permutations in matrices. In this part we apply Method 3 above (Section 2.1.3) to tackle
the problem of solving the matrix equation
XA = BY,
where A and B are given k×n matrices, andX is an invertible k× k matrix and Y is an n×n permutation
matrix, both of which we want to find.
Suppose the the first row of X is the vector (of indeterminates) x := (x1, x2, . . . , xk). If
ℓ1(x), . . . , ℓn(x) ∈ K[x1, . . . , xk] are the linear forms dual to the columns of A (in this order), then first we
would like to find x1, . . . , xk such that the vector
w(x) := x ·A = (ℓ1(x), . . . , ℓn(x)),
equals σ ∗ v, for some σ ∈ Sn, where v is the first row of the given matrix B.
By Lemma 2.3 (4), the solutions of our problem will be points in Kk, common zero locus of the polyno-
mials
Qv(ℓ1(x)), Qv(ℓ2(x)), . . . , Qv(ℓn(x)),
hence an affine variety (see [1]). We denote this variety Vv.
For each solution x obtained, we will use Method 3 to determine the corresponding permutation(s) σ ∈
Sn, such that w(x) = σ ∗ v. Denote this set of permutations with Λx,v, and let
Λv :=
⋃
x
Λx,v.
Next, we apply the same computations when v is the second row, third row, all the way to the last row of
the matrix B. This way we obtain k sets of permutations Λv1 , . . . ,Λvk . Since we assume that our matrix
equation has a solution, the intersection Λ := Λv1 ∩ · · · ∩ Λvk is non-empty. Any σ ∈ Λ will give us the
matrix Y = In(σ
−1), and any k vectors x1, . . . ,xk with w(xi) = σ ∗ vi, i = 1, . . . , k, will be the rows, in
this order, of the matrix X.
Another idea to find σ ∈ Λ without applying Method 3 k times, but just once, is to check which per-
mutations from Λv1 are in Λv2 , and from this smaller set to check which permutation is in Λv3 , and so
forth.
Example 2.5. Suppose K = R, and let
A =
(
8 −1 1 2
11 −2 1 3
)
and B =
(
1 0 1 2
−1 1 0 3
)
.
We have x = (x1, x2), and
ℓ1(x) = 8x1 + 11x2, ℓ2(x) = −x1 − 2x2, ℓ3(x) = x1 + x2, ℓ4(x) = 2x1 + 3x2.
• Solving the system (using [5])
(ℓ1(x)− 1)(ℓ1(x)− 0)(ℓ1(x)− 1)(ℓ1(x)− 2) = 0
(ℓ2(x)− 1)(ℓ2(x)− 0)(ℓ2(x)− 1)(ℓ2(x)− 2) = 0
(ℓ3(x)− 1)(ℓ3(x)− 0)(ℓ3(x)− 1)(ℓ3(x)− 2) = 0
(ℓ4(x)− 1)(ℓ4(x)− 0)(ℓ4(x)− 1)(ℓ4(x)− 2) = 0
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gives the solutions {(3,−2), (0, 0)}. We drop the solution (0, 0) because this vector cannot be the first row
of the invertible matrix X.
We then have w(3,−2) = (2, 1, 1, 0), and
Λv1 = {(142), (1423)}.
• Solving the system (using [5])
(ℓ1(x) + 1)(ℓ1(x)− 1)(ℓ1(x)− 0)(ℓ1(x)− 3) = 0
(ℓ2(x) + 1)(ℓ2(x)− 1)(ℓ2(x)− 0)(ℓ2(x)− 3) = 0
(ℓ3(x) + 1)(ℓ3(x)− 1)(ℓ3(x)− 0)(ℓ3(x)− 3) = 0
(ℓ4(x) + 1)(ℓ4(x)− 1)(ℓ4(x)− 0)(ℓ4(x)− 3) = 0
gives the solutions {(−1, 1), (0, 0)}. We drop the solution (0, 0) because this vector cannot be the second
row of the invertible matrix X.
We then have w(−1, 1) = (3,−1, 0, 1), and
Λv2 = {(142)}.
We obtained Λ = Λv1 ∩ Λv2 = {(142)}, hence the solution of the matrix equation XA = BY is
Y = I4((241)) =


0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0

 and X =
(
3 −2
−1 1
)
.
Unfortunately, finding the affine variety Vv, requires a lot of computer power. If the polynomial Qv(T )
has u distinct factors, then in order to compute this variety we need to solve un linear systems of n equations
and k indeterminates. Even for simple examples, such as Example 3.3 below, Macaulay 2 ([5]) failed to
complete the task in reasonable time.
3. APPLICATION: AN ATTACK ON MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEMS BUILT ON REED-SOLOMON CODES
3.1. Linear Codes. The basics of coding theory can be found for example in [6], or for a very friendly
introduction, in [10]. Below we sum up some of the most important concepts and techniques.
Let C be an [n, k, d]−linear code with generating matrix (in canonical bases)
G =


a11 a12 · · · a1n
a21 a22 · · · a2n
...
...
...
ak1 ak2 · · · akn

 ,
where aij ∈ K, any field.
By this, one understands that C is the image of the injective linear map
φ : Kk
G
−→ Kn.
n is the length of C, k is the dimension of C and d is the minimum distance (or Hamming distance), the
smallest number of non-zero entries in a non-zero element of C.
The elements of C are called codewords. To decode a codeword y, means to find (the unique) x ∈ Kk
such that x ·G = y.
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3.1.1. Decoding via Gaussian elimination. One rather simple technique to find x = (x1, . . . , xk) is the
following: to the generating matrix G append y as a last row, and the vector of new indeterminates
(r1, . . . , rk, y)
T as a last column, to obtain a new matrix G¯y of size (k+1)× (n+1). If one does Gaussian
elimination to bring G¯y to echelon form, the entry in position (k+1, n+1) is exactly y−(x1r1+· · ·+xkrk)
that should equal 0. Hence we obtained the vector x. This works because y is the linear combination of the
k rows of G, with coefficients x1, . . . , xk.
As an example, with K = F3, suppose G =

 1 0 2 1 01 1 0 1 2
0 2 1 2 1

 and y = (2, 2, 1, 0, 1). The new
matrix is G¯y =


1 0 2 1 0 | r1
1 1 0 1 2 | r2
0 2 1 2 1 | r3
1 1 2 0 2 | y

 , with echelon form


1 0 2 1 0 | r1
0 1 1 0 2 | 2r1 + r2
0 0 2 2 0 | 2r1 + r2 + 3r3
0 0 0 0 0 | y + 2r1 + 2r2 + r3

 .
This implies that y + 2r1 + 2r2 + r3 = 0, which gives x = (1, 1, 2).
In Section 1 we mentioned already the parity check matrix of a code. This (n − k) × n matrix H :=
[−AT |In−k] is important because the fundamental property: y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ C if and only if Hy
T = 0.
So the entries of y satisfy n − k homogeneous linear equations; in fact, these n − k relations form a basis
for the space, denoted F (C), of the linear dependencies among the columns of G.
For any vector w ∈ Kn, the weight of w, denoted wt(w), is the number of non-zero entries in w.
Codewords of weight equal to d are called codewords of minimum weight, so such a codeword is a non-zero
vector y = (y1, . . . , yn) in the kernel of the parity-check matrix, for which there exist 1 ≤ j1 < . . . <
jn−d ≤ n with yj1 = · · · = yjn−d = 0. It is clear that any such vector multiplied by a non-zero scalar
will lead to another codeword of minimum weight. Therefore, it is more convenient to consider projective
codewords of minimum weight, which will mean the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation: w1 ∼
w2 if and only if w1 = cw2, for some c ∈ \{0}. The equivalence class of w is denoted [w].
To sum up, the set of projective codewords of minimum weight of an [n, k, d]−linear code C form the
projective variety
V(C, d+ 1) := V (F (C), {yi1 · · · yid+1| for all 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < id+1 ≤ n}) ⊂ P
n−1;
see [4, Section 3.2]) for details. This remark is the analog of the method described in [8] which was based
on [2], but using projective varieties in Pn−1, instead of projective varieties in Pk−1.
3.1.2. Reed-Solomon codes. We present these classical linear codes from the point of view of BCH codes
(see [10, Section 18.9]). Let K := Fq be the finite field with q elements. Let n = q − 1, and let α be a
primitive n−th root of unity. Let 1 ≤ d < n and consider the polynomial
g(x) := (x− α)(x − α2) · · · (x− αd−1) = g0 + g1x+ · · ·+ gd−2x
d−2 + xd−1 ∈ Fq[x].
The Reed-Solomon code is defined to be the linear code with generating matrix of size k × n, with k =
n+ 1− d,
G =


g0 g1 · · · gd−2 1 0 · · · 0
0 g0 g1 · · · gd−2 1 · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 · · · 0 g0 g1 · · · gd−2 1

 , gi 6= 0, i = 0, . . . , d− 2.
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It is known that the Reed-Solomon code has parameters [n, k, d], hence, because d = n − k + 1, it is a
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code.
If C is an [n, k, d]−linear code with d = n − k + 1 (so an MDS code), then the number of projec-
tive codewords of minimum weight is
(
n
d
)
(see for example [8, Corollary 3.3]). In the setup of MDS
codes, the question we want to answer is the following: for any choice of 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < in−d ≤ n, is
V (F (C), yi1 , . . . , yin−d) a single projective codeword of minimum weight? By the lemma below, the answer
is yes.
Lemma 3.1. Let C be an [n, k, d] MDS code. Then, for any 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < in−d ≤ n, one has
dimK SpanK(F (C) ∪ {yi1 , . . . , yin−d}) = n− 1.
Proof. LetM be a generating matrix of C, and suppose there exist an element of F (C) of the form c1yi1 +
· · ·+ cn−dyin−d . Then, the corresponding n−d = k−1 columns ofM are linearly dependent, so they span
a subspace of dimension < k− 1. By [9, Remarks 2.2 and 2.3] we obtain that the minimum distance of C is
< n− k + 1, which is a contradiction.
So the n − k elements of the basis of F (C) together with yi1 , . . . , yin−d , are n − k + n − d = n − 1
linearly independent linear forms. 
3.2. McEliece cryptosystems. We follow the description of this public key cryptosystem according to [10,
Section 18.10].
Bob chooses a k × n matrix G that is the generating matrix of an [n, k, d]−linear code, denoted C. Also
he chooses a k × k invertible matrix S, and a n× n permutation matrix P . Bob keeps the matrices G,S, P
secret and makes public (the public key) the k × n matrix
G1 := SGP.
Alicewants to send privately to Bob the plain text x ∈ Kk. To encrypt x, Alice chooses randomly a vector
e ∈ Kn with wt(e) = t ≤ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋. She forms the the ciphertext by computing
y := xG1 + e.
Bob decrypts y as follows:
(1) He calculates y1 = yP
−1 = xSG+e1, where e1 = eP
−1. Since P−1 is also a permutation matrix,
the weight of e1 also equals t.
(2) Since S is invertible, and since SG is a k × n matrix with its rows being linear combinations of the
rows of G, then SG is a generating matrix for the same linear code C. Bob “error-corrects” y1 to
get rid of the “error” e1, and obtains the nearest-neighbor codeword y¯ := xSG ∈ C. The condition
t ≤ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ ensures that y¯ is unique.
(3) Bob decodes y¯: he finds x¯ ∈ Kk with y¯ = x¯G.
(4) Bob computes x = x¯S−1.
The secret matrix G is chosen in such manner that it is very efficient to encrypt x and decrypt y, based
upon effective algorithms to error-correct and decode this linear code (choosing Goppa codes seems to
balance the security requirements and the efficiency mentioned above). An outside attacker has knowledge
only of the public key, which is the matrixG1. So a priori, in order to error-correct and decode the intercepted
ciphertext y to find the secret plaintext x, the attacker needs to apply “general” algorithms; and this is known
to be an NP-hard problem. But if the permutation matrix P is known to the attacker, then the matrix G1P
−1
is a generating matrix of the same secret chosen code. Knowing what kind of code was chosen initially,
the attacker can use the same efficient algorithms to error-correct and decode. So keeping the permutation
matrix secret is of utmost importance for the security of the McEliece cryptosystem.
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3.2.1. McEliece cryptosystems built on Reed-Solomon codes. In what follows we assume that G is the
generating matrix of a Reed-Solomon code.
If the outside attacker knows what is the chosen primitive element α of the base field K := Fq, then
he/she will know what is the matrix G (see Section 3.1.2). This is because G1 is a k × n generating matrix
of an MDS [n, k]−linear code, hence d = n− k + 1.
Suppose the outside attacker doesn’t know the chosen primitive element of K. Since K is the finite field
with q elements, then q = pz, for some prime number p, and so the number of primitive elements of α ∈ Fq
equals the Euler’s function evaluated at q − 1, i.e., φ(q − 1). In this instance, for each primitive element α,
the matrix Gα that generates the corresponding Reed-Solomon code is known. So the attacker may try all
the possible primitive elements and see which one works; obviously not the best strategy to pursue. It seems
that finding the right primitive element translates into a complex Discrete Log problem, and this will be the
focus of a future project (also check Section 3.2.2).
Suppose we are the attackers, and we know the chosen primitive element α. The our goal is to find
the matrices S and P from G1 = SGP . As we mentioned at the beginning, we want to solve the matrix
equation
XA = BY,
when A = G1, and B = G are given.
Denote g := (g0, . . . , gd−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0), the first row ofG. Let τ ∈ Sn denote the cycle (nn−1 · · · 2 1).
Then the second row of G is τ ∗ g, the third row of G is τ2 ∗ g, and so forth. This observation reduces
drastically the computations. Instead of solving k systems of equations

Qv(ℓ1(x)) = 0
Qv(ℓ2(x)) = 0
...
Qv(ℓn(x)) = 0,
with v scanning over all rows of G, it is enough to solve just one system when v = g.
The solution will consist of at least k points x1, . . . ,xm, and for each i = 1, . . . ,m define
∆i := {σ ∈ Sn|w(xi) = σ ∗ g}.
What remains to be found is a set of distinct indices i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and a permutation σ such
that
τ j−1σ ∈ ∆ij , for all j = 1, . . . , k.
In this instance, σ will give the permutation matrix P = In(σ
−1), and xi1 , . . . ,xik will give, in this partic-
ular order, the rows of the matrix S−1.
We have that for all j = 1, . . . , k,
w(xij ) = (τ
j−1σ) ∗ g,
for some σ ∈ Sn.
Since w(xi1) = (σ) ∗ g, we can determine all other xi2 , . . . ,xik , via the formula
w(xij ) = (σ
−1τ j−1σ) ∗w(xi1) = w(xi1) · In(σ
−1(τ−1)j−1σ), j = 2, . . . , k.
To sum up, the way this attack is going is the following:
STEP 1: Compute the affine variety Vg := V (Qg(ℓ1(x)), . . . , Qg(ℓn(x))) = {x1, . . . ,xm}.
STEP 2: Record all the vectorsW := {w(x1), . . . ,w(xm)}.
STEP 3: Pick an xi0 ∈ V , and compute ∆i0 .
STEP 4: Pick a σ ∈ ∆i0 and calculate (σ
−1τ j−1σ) ∗w(xi0) for j = 2, . . . , k, where τ = (nn− 1 · · · 2 1).
STEP 5: If there is one vector at STEP 4 that does not belong toW , then pick a different permutation in∆i0 ,
and repeat STEP 4.
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STEP 6: If for each permutation in ∆i0 there is a vector not in W , then pick a different element of V , and
redo the algorithm from STEP 3.
We mentioned already that computing the affine variety Vg is a challenge, so in what follows we will use
codewords of minimum weight to avoid STEP 1 above.
AN ATTACK USING CODEWORDS OF MINIMUMWEIGHT. For this attack we have to rely on projec-
tive geometry. The projective vector
[g] := [g0, . . . , gd−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0],
which is the first row of G is a projective codeword of minimum weight of G1, after permuting its entries
according to the matrix P . In fact each of the k rows of G will lead to a distinct projective codeword of
minimum weight for G1.
Since G1 generates an MDS code (i.e., d = n− k+1), from the
(
n
d
)
projective codewords of minimum
weight of this code, we will select those that, after a permutation, equal to [g]. Once these were determined,
then STEPS 1 and 2 in the previous algorithm are completed, and we can continue with the remaining
STEPS to determine the matrix P . After this, a simple Gaussian elimination algorithm will give the matrix
S.
Let us rewrite the notations and constructions used at the beginning of Section 2.1.3. Suppose v =
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ K
n is a vector of weightm. Define the polynomial
Qv(T ) = (T − v1)(T − v2) · · · (T − vn) ∈ K[T ],
and denote with qi(v), i = 0, . . . , n the coefficient of T
i. By Vieta’s formulas, with qn(v) = 1, for
k = 1, . . . , n, one has
qn−k(v) = (−1)
k
∑
1≤i1<···<ik≤n
vi1vi2 · · · vik .
Of course, if wt(v) = m, then qn−m−1(v) = · · · = q0(v) = 0 and qn−m(v) 6= 0.
Lemma 3.2. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn),w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ K
n. Then, there exist σ ∈ Sn such that [w] =
[σ ∗ v] if and only if there exist c ∈ K \ {0} such that for all i = 0, . . . , n, one has qi(w) = c
n−iqi(v).
Proof. We have that [w] = [σ ∗v] if and only if there exists c ∈ K\{0} such thatw = c(σ ∗v) = σ ∗ (cv).
Then, from Lemma 2.3 (3), this is equivalent to
qi(w) = qi(cv) = (−1)
n−i
∑
1≤i1<···<in−i≤n
(cvi1) · · · (cvin−i) = c
n−iqi(v).

For convenience, if v is a vector of weightm, and since qn(v) = 1, we consider the vector
q(w) = (−qn−1(w), qn−2(w), . . . , (−1)
mqn−m(w)).
Then, with these notations, we have that [w] = [σ ∗ v] and wt(w) = wt(v) = d, if and only if there exists
c ∈ K \ {0} such that
q(w) = q(v) ·


c 0 · · · 0
0 c2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · cd

 .
If we want to select all the codewords of minimum weight whose entries are the same as the entries of
g = (g0, . . . , gd−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0), but in different positions, one has to do the following:
• First find all projective codewords of minimum weight of the linear code C1 with generating matrix G1,
by determining V(C1, d+ 1) (see Section 3.1).
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• Use Lemma 3.2, and the comments after it to select those [w] ∈ V(C1, d + 1) that are permutations of
[g].
• To find the right representative we determine the corresponding c, and multiply w by c−1.
This way we obtain the list of vectors W mentioned at STEP 2 in Section 3.2.1. To finish this attack,
we proceed with the remaining steps presented back in that section, with the caveat that after we obtain the
appropriate k vectors in W that give the desired permutation matrix P , we have to decode these vectors to
obtain the rows of S−1. For this purpose, we can use the decoding algorithm briefly described in Section
3.1.1.
Example 3.3. Suppose K := F7, the prime field with 7 elements, with primitive element considered being
α = 3. Then
G =

 6 1 3 1 0 00 6 1 3 1 0
0 0 6 1 3 1

 ,
so n = 6, d = 4, and k = 3 (we borrowed the first Example in [10, Chapter 18.9]). Suppose we have
G1 =

 1 2 3 6 6 14 0 4 6 1 0
0 2 5 4 6 3

 .
The parity-check matrix is
HG1 =

 3 4 6 1 0 01 1 4 0 1 0
3 6 4 0 0 1

 ,
and hence
F (C) = 〈3y1 + 4y2 + 6y3 + y4, y1 + y2 + 4y3 + y5, 3y1 + 6y2 + 4y3 + y6〉.
The projective codewords of minimum weight are the
(
6
4
)
= 15 distinct solutions of the system of
equations
3y1 + 4y2 + 6y3 + y4 = 0
y1 + y2 + 4y3 + y5 = 0
3y1 + 6y2 + 4y3 + y6 = 0
y1y2y3y4y5 = 0
y1y2y3y4y6 = 0
y1y2y3y5y6 = 0
y1y3y4y5y6 = 0
y1y2y4y5y6 = 0
y2y3y4y5y6 = 0.
We have g = (6, 1, 3, 1, 0, 0), so
q(g) = (4, 2, 3, 4).
We have the following table of results
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[w] q(w) c c2 c3 c4 Select?
[5, 5, 1, 1, 0, 0] (5, 4, 4, 4) 5 · 4−1 = 3 4 · 2−1 = 2 = 32 4 · 3−1 = 6 = 33 4 · 4−1 = 1 6= 34 No
[0, 4, 6, 4, 0, 1] (1, 1, 6, 5) 1 · 4−1 = 2 1 · 2−1 = 4 = 22 6 · 3−1 = 2 6= 23 No
[3, 0, 1, 6, 0, 1] (4, 2, 3, 4) 4 · 4−1 = 1 2 · 2−1 = 1 = 12 3 · 3−1 = 1 = 13 4 · 4−1 = 1 = 14 Yes
[5, 2, 0, 5, 0, 1] (6, 1, 4, 1) 6 · 4−1 = 5 1 · 2−1 = 4 = 52 4 · 3−1 = 6 = 53 1 · 4−1 = 2 = 54 Yes
[1, 5, 2, 0, 0, 1] (2, 4, 6, 3) 2 · 4−1 = 4 4 · 2−1 = 2 = 42 6 · 3−1 = 2 6= 43 No
[5, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0] (2, 4, 6, 3) 2 · 4−1 = 4 6 · 3−1 = 2 6= 43 No
[4, 0, 4, 6, 1, 0] (1, 1, 6, 5) 1 · 4−1 = 2 6 · 3−1 = 2 6= 23 No
[0, 3, 6, 1, 1, 0] (4, 2, 3, 4) 4 · 4−1 = 1 2 · 2−1 = 1 = 12 3 · 3−1 = 1 = 13 4 · 4−1 = 1 = 14 Yes
[2, 5, 5, 0, 1, 0] (6, 1, 4, 1) 6 · 4−1 = 5 1 · 2−1 = 4 = 52 4 · 3−1 = 6 = 53 1 · 4−1 = 2 = 54 Yes
[0, 1, 0, 3, 6, 1] (4, 2, 3, 4) 4 · 4−1 = 1 2 · 2−1 = 1 = 12 3 · 3−1 = 1 = 13 4 · 4−1 = 1 = 14 Yes
[6, 0, 4, 0, 6, 1] (3, 2, 4, 4) 3 · 4−1 = 6 2 · 2−1 = 1 = 62 4 · 3−1 = 6 = 63 4 · 4−1 = 1 = 64 Yes
[0, 0, 5, 5, 1, 1] (5, 4, 4, 4) 5 · 4−1 = 3 4 · 4−1 = 1 6= 34 No
[3, 3, 0, 0, 1, 1] (1, 1, 3, 2) 1 · 4−1 = 2 1 · 2−1 = 4 = 22 3 · 3−1 = 1 = 23 2 · 4−1 = 4 6= 24 No
[2, 0, 0, 1, 5, 1] (2, 4, 6, 3) 2 · 4−1 = 4 6 · 3−1 = 2 6= 43 No
[0, 6, 3, 0, 3, 1] (6, 1, 1, 5) 6 · 4−1 = 5 1 · 2−1 = 4 = 52 1 · 3−1 = 5 6= 53 No
We got six selections. After multiplying by the corresponding c−1, we get the six vectors which are the
rows of the matrix:
W =


3 0 1 6 0 1
1 6 0 1 0 3
0 3 6 1 1 0
6 1 1 0 3 0
0 1 0 3 6 1
1 0 3 0 1 6


.
Next we pick up and continue using the algorithm in Section 3.2.1.
STEP 3: Let us pick the third row ofW as our
w(xi0) = (0, 3, 6, 1, 1, 0) =: w.
STEP 4: In Example 2.4, we computed ∆i0 . Let’s pick σ = (15423) ∈ ∆i0 . With τ = (654321) we
calculate
w · I6(σ
−1τ−1σ) = w · I6((163425)) = (1, 1, 0, 6, 3, 0),
which is not inW .
STEP 5: Let’s pick σ = (16523) ∈ ∆i0 . Then
w · I6(σ
−1τ−1σ) = w · I6((135246)) = (0, 1, 0, 3, 6, 1),
and, with (τ2)−1 = (135)(246),
w · I6(σ
−1(τ2)−1σ) = w · I6((154)(263)) = (1, 6, 0, 1, 0, 3).
These vectors are the fifth, and respectively, the second rows ofW .
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This is telling us that the permutation matrix P is
P = I6((16523)
−1) =


0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0


.
• Decoding the codeword of minimum weight (0, 3, 6, 1, 1, 0), we get the first row of the matrix S−1 to
be (4, 6, 1).
• Decoding the codeword of minimum weight (0, 1, 0, 3, 6, 1), we get the second row of the matrix S−1
to be (2, 3, 2).
• Decoding the codeword of minimum weight (1, 6, 0, 1, 0, 3), we get the third row of the matrix S−1 to
be (3, 3, 0).
So
S−1 =

 4 6 12 3 2
3 3 0

 .
3.2.2. Finding the chosen primitive element. In this section we briefly discuss a method to discover the
chosen primitive element α of K, only if we have knowledge of the matrix G1.
By Section 3.1.2 the first row of the k × n matrix Gα is the vector
gα := (g0(α), g1(α), . . . , gd−2(α), gd−1(α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
, 0, . . . , 0),
with d = n − k + 1, where gi(α) is the coefficient of x
i in gα(x) := (x − α)(x − α
2) · · · (x − αd−1), for
i = 0, . . . , d− 1, hence
gi(α) = (−1)
(d−1)−i
∑
1≤j1<···<j(d−1)−i≤d−1
αj1+···+j(d−1)−i .
Withe these we construct the familiar vector
q(gα) =

. . . , ∑
0≤i1<···<ij≤d−1
(gi1(α) · · · gij (α)), . . .

 .
Suppose we determined [w], a projective codeword of minimum weight (equal to d). Suppose q(w) =
(A1, . . . , Ad) ∈ K
d. By solving the following system of equations in unknowns X and Y , we determine if
there is a scalar c 6= 0, and a primitive element α such that w is some permutation of the vector cgα.
Y A1 = g0(X) + · · ·+ gd−1(X)
...
Y jAj =
∑
0≤i1<···<ij≤d−1
(gi1(X) · · · gij (X))
...
Y dAd = g0(X) · · · gd−1(X).
The solution, if it exists, will be Y = c−1, and X = α.
Because gd−1(X) = 1, we can rearrange the equations in the following way.
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g0(X) + · · · + gd−2(X) = Y A1 − 1∑
0≤i<j≤d−2
(gi(X)gj(X)) = Y
2A2 − Y A1 + 1
...∑
0≤i1<···<ij≤d−2
(gi1(X) · · · gij (X)) = Y
jAj − Y
j−1Aj−1 + · · · + (−1)
j−1Y A1 + (−1)
j
...
g0(X) · · · gd−2(X) = Y
d−1Ad−1 − · · ·+ (−1)
d−2Y A1 + (−1)
d−1
Y dAd = g0(X) · · · gd−2(X).
The last two equations tell us that c−1 is a root in K of the polynomial
Uw(Y ) = AdY
d −Ad−1Y
d−1 + · · ·+ (−1)d−1A1Y + (−1)
d ∈ K[Y ].
For each such root we find a common solution in K of the first d− 2 equations above, with Y substituted
by c−1 (we can do this by computing the greatest common divisor of the corresponding d− 2 polynomials,
and factoring this common divisor completely). This common solution is a candidate for the primitive root
of K. As we will see in the example below, same projective codeword of minimum weight [w] can lead to
different primitive roots.
Example 3.4. Let us consider the situation in Example 3.3. We have
g0(X) = −X
6, g1(X) = X
3(1 +X +X2), g2(X) = −X(1 +X +X
2), g3(X) = 1.
• Let us consider the projective codeword of minimum weight, listed first in the table in that example:
[w] = [5, 5, 1, 1, 0, 0]. We have q(w) = (5, 4, 4, 4), so A1 = 5, A2 = 4, A3 = 4, A4 = 4. The polynomial
Uw(Y ) = 4Y
4 − 4Y 3 + 4Y 2 − 5Y + 1 = (−3)(Y − 1)2(Y − 3)2,
has roots c−1 = 1, 3.
The greatest common divisor of the polynomials
g0(X) + g1(X) + g2(X) − 5c
−1 + 1
g0(X)g1(X) + g0(X)g2(X) + g1(X)g2(X) − 4(c
−1)2 + 5c−1 − 1
g0(X)g1(X)g2(X) − 4(c
−1)3 + 4(c−1)2 − 5c−1 + 1
is the constant polynomial 1 for both values of c−1; so no common solution.
• Let us consider the projective codeword of minimum weight, listed third in the table in that example:
[w] = [3, 0, 1, 6, 0, 1]. We have q(w) = (4, 2, 3, 4), so A1 = 4, A2 = 2, A3 = 3, A4 = 4. The polynomial
Uw(Y ) = 4Y
4 − 3Y 3 + 2Y 2 − 4Y + 1 = (−3)(Y − 1)2(Y + 2)(Y + 1),
has roots c−1 = 1,−2,−1.
The greatest common divisor of the polynomials
g0(X) + g1(X) + g2(X) − 4c
−1 + 1
g0(X)g1(X) + g0(X)g2(X) + g1(X)g2(X) − 2(c
−1)2 + 4c−1 − 1
g0(X)g1(X)g2(X) − 3(c
−1)3 + 2(c−1)2 − 4c−1 + 1
is
(1) Y − 3, if c−1 = 1,
(2) the constant polynomials 1 if c−1 = −2,
(3) Y + 2, if c−1 = −1.
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In the first case, α = 3, and c = 1, which is exactly what we obtained in the table.
In the second case we have no common solution.
In the third case, α = 5, and c = 6. We have g5 = (6, 4, 6, 1, 0, 0), and cg5 = (1, 3, 1, 6, 0, 0), which is
indeed a permutation of w = (3, 0, 1, 6, 0, 1).
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